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THE USE OF EXPERTS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS  
IN SINGAPORE INVOLVING  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In intellectual property (“IP”) cases decided in recent years in 
Singapore, the use of expert evidence is commonplace. 
Weaknesses in that expert evidence are commonplace too; 
sometimes the weaknesses are such that the evidence should 
be excluded, on other occasions they render the evidence of 
little value. However, in all cases the reliance on expert 
evidence will have increased the cost of the litigation for both 
sides (and rarely does the costs award make that increase 
good for the successful party). Aside from the more general 
policy concerns regarding expert evidence, this is an 
important reason why the courts must always be vigilant in 
ensuring in IP cases that expert evidence is allowed only 
when it is clearly of assistance to them in their role as the 
ultimate arbiter on questions of law. 
David LLEWELYN 
Professor (Practice) and Deputy Dean, School of Law,  
Singapore Management University;  
Professor of Intellectual Property Law, King’s College London. 
I. Introduction 
1 The use of expert evidence in legal proceedings in Singapore 
involving intellectual property (“IP”) rights is so common that it rarely 
gives advisers much cause for thought, even though as a matter of law 
there is no entitlement to adduce such evidence unless, under the new 
but still relatively limited wording of s 47 of the Evidence Act,1 the court 
is likely to derive assistance from an opinion upon a point of scientific, 
technical or other specialised knowledge, in which case the opinions of 
experts upon that point are relevant facts. Although some IP cases 
require expert evidence in those areas, a not insignificant number does 
not and yet expert evidence is still adduced on matters which are within 
the judge’s knowledge and experience to decide without that so-called 
expert evidence. Inevitably, this has a knock-on effect on the cost of 
litigating IP disputes: once one side decides to use an expert witness, the 
                                                                       
1 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed, as amended by s 8 of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2012 
(Act 4 of 2012) with effect from 1 August 2012. On the previous wording of s 47 
and the recommendation that it be amended to broaden its scope, see Law Reform 
Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform Committee on 
Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at paras 10–11. 
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other will follow suit for fear of being criticised by either its client or the 
court for not doing so. This issue is worthy of particular focus now as 
there is increasing concern that the cost of IP litigation effectively 
excludes from the litigation process, both as willing plaintiffs and 
unwilling defendants,2 many of the small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”) on which much of Singapore’s future growth is likely to 
depend. It is noteworthy also that in England, with effect from 1 April 
2013, the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules 19983 has 
been reframed to be “dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost” 
[emphasis added].4 
2 At the outset, it is important to recognise, as the Law Reform 
Committee explained in its 2011 Report on Opinion Evidence (“LRC 
Report”),5 that the Evidence Act’s exclusionary approach to the 
admissibility of evidence (“[e]verything that’s not in is out”,6 
exemplified by the wording in s 5 to the effect that evidence of facts in 
issue and other relevant facts is admissible but “of no others”) is the 
opposite of modern evidence law in other jurisdictions where evidence 
is admitted unless specifically excluded.7 
                                                                       
2 One of the comments received by the author while writing this article was that 
parties to High Court litigation are prepared to spend money, so the cost of 
unnecessary expert evidence is not a significant issue; however, it is perhaps worth 
bearing in mind that (a) plaintiffs choose whether to litigate in the High Court, 
defendants do not; and (b) some parties who would like to litigate in the High 
Court do not because of the cost. In his Response at the Opening of the Legal Year 
on 4 January 2013, Sundaresh Menon CJ concluded: 
This brings me to the close of this morning’s proceedings. I return at this stage 
to the quest I have mentioned, to persist in the effort to make things even 
better than they already are. This is a quest that must unite all of us in the legal 
community. If the law is foundational to society, then we, who are the 
servants of the law, must constantly reflect on how we can make it more 
responsive to the needs of our evolving society. We must ensure that we do 
not price the law out of the reach of the average Singaporean; that we are 
guided by our care and concern for those whose lot it is to come face to face 
with the law; and that we do not allow the law to become the preserve of the 
rarefied few as a result of systems, processes and outputs that seem obscure or 
even confounding to the reasonably informed lay person. 
3 SI 1998/3132. 
4 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) r 1.1. In Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora 
Inc (No 2) [2013] EWCA Civ 319, Lewison LJ commented (at [30]) of this change: 
“This will make it all the more important for judges to exercise their power to limit 
or exclude technically admissible evidence which is not of real value.” 
5 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011). 
6 See Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) paragraph heading to para 30. 
7 See Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at paras 13–36. 
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3 There are numerous areas in which parties to IP disputes in 
Singapore have relied on expert witnesses over recent years. 
4 In patent infringement proceedings, experts are almost always 
called to give evidence on the meaning of technical words and phrases 
in the patent specification and the “common general knowledge” that 
the notional skilled person would have had at the relevant time,8 in 
assisting the court to determine the scope of the claims in the patent. 
Likewise in patent invalidity or revocation proceedings, the experts will 
help the court (or alternatively, in the latter case, the Registrar)9 in 
coming to its conclusions on whether the invention was not patentable 
(that is, it was not new, did not involve an inventive step and/or was not 
capable of industrial application, as required by s 13(1) of the Patents 
Act),10 whether the patent specification disclosed the invention 
sufficiently for it be performed by a person skilled in the art,11 and/or 
whether matter was added to the specification in the course of its 
prosecution that went beyond that originally filed.12 
5 In registered design infringement cases, which also involve 
monopoly rights so that knowledge and intention are irrelevant, expert 
                                                                       
8 Lubrizol v Esso Petroleum [1998] RPC 727 (CA) at 738, per Aldous LJ. 
9 Section 80 of the Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed). 
10 Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed. 
11 Section 25(4) of the Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed) provides that the 
specification must be sufficiently “clear and complete” for the invention to be 
performed by the person skilled in the art and s 80(1) provides this as a ground for 
revocation. 
12 Also, and more esoterically (the author is indebted to George Wei JC for pointing 
this out), in Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 357 
(genetically modified plants possessing a gene conferring protection against certain 
herbicides) it was contended before the European Patent Office Technical Board of 
Appeal that the invention was contrary to ordre public or morality (environmental 
risks, etc) and was therefore not patentable. The opponents (Greenpeace) had 
commissioned a survey of Swedish farmers that purported to demonstrate that 
82% were against genetic engineering of plants. An opinion poll was also 
commissioned in Switzerland that showed 69% were against the patentability of 
plants and animals. Unsurprisingly, the Board found, at 373, that the survey and 
opinion poll were not decisive, partly because of the size of the surveys and also 
because they could not be said to be representative of Europe as a whole. In 
Singapore, see s 13 of the Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed): 
(2) An invention the publication or exploitation of which would be 
generally expected to encourage offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour is 
not a patentable invention. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), behaviour shall not be regarded 
as offensive, immoral or anti-social only because it is prohibited by any law in 
force in Singapore. 
Were such an issue to come before the courts in Singapore, there seems little doubt 
that expert evidence would be adduced, although to what effect must be 
questioned. 
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evidence may be required to help the court decide the question of the 
validity of a particular design. 
6 In trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, 
experts are often called to give evidence on the essential legal issue for 
the court of whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion or actual 
(or likely) deception, respectively, between the plaintiff ’s mark (or, 
strictly, the trade indicia the use of which has generated goodwill, in a 
passing off action) and the sign or trade indicia used by the defendant.13 
That evidence often takes the form of survey evidence (introduced by 
way of the expert evidence of the person who devised the survey), 
especially if the alleged infringement or passing off has commenced 
only recently and there is therefore no actual evidence of confusion or 
deception. 
7 In copyright infringement proceedings, experts are called to 
give evidence on the similarity between the plaintiff ’s copyright work 
and the allegedly infringing work produced by the defendant and also 
on design practices in the field in question (that may go to the question 
of whether there has been sufficient copying of original work of the 
plaintiff). 
8 Finally, experts are occasionally used to help with complicated 
technology in breach of confidence cases (which some characterise as IP).14 
II. The basis for admission of expert evidence 
9 As the expert is giving opinion evidence, the admissibility of 
that evidence depends on its falling within a permitted exception to the 
rule against hearsay testimony. In the words of the Law Reform 
Committee,15 “these rules were created to minimise the inherent danger 
                                                                       
13 Expert evidence may also be relevant (in a legal sense) if it is contended that a trade 
mark application is for a shape that is exclusively one that is needed to achieve a 
technical effect and is therefore unregistrable under s 7(3)(b) of the Trade Marks 
Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed). Conversely, by analogy to the patent issue referred to 
in n 12 above, it is unlikely that such evidence would assist on the issue of whether 
an application is for a mark that is contrary to public policy or morality under 
s 7(4). 
14 On breach of confidence generally, see William Cornish, David Llewelyn &  
Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied  
Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2013) ch 8, and on the nature of the liability, 
paras 8-01–8-09. In Coogan v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 48, 
Lord Neuberger MR (after referring to the cited passages from the 7th Ed of 
Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin) concluded at [39] that “while the prevailing current 
view is that confidential information is not strictly property, it is not inappropriate 
to include it as an aspect of intellectual property”. 
15 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 2. On the traditional 
(cont’d on the next page) © 2013 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
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that tribunals of fact, in most cases juries, will place undue emphasis on 
expert opinions and abdicate their ultimate responsibility to draw their 
own conclusions on all the relevant facts in dispute.” 
10 In Singapore, the position is now regulated by the recently 
amended s 47(1) of the Evidence Act:16 
When the court is likely to derive assistance from an opinion upon a 
point of scientific, technical or other specialised knowledge, the 
opinions of experts on that point are relevant facts. 
11 The amendment to section 47(1) was made in response to a 
recommendation in the LRC Report.17 
                                                                                                                               
rationale for the rule that expert evidence should not be given on the ultimate issue 
for decision by the court, that it may unduly influence the jury or usurp the role of 
the court, Jeffrey Pinsler in Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2010) at para 8.32 cites Director of Public Prosecutions v A and BC Chewing Gum 
[1968] QB 159 to indicate that the “rule has lost its force” and submits this is 
particularly so where the trier of fact is a judge “as he is very much more likely than 
a jury to be able to appreciate the subtleties involved in relying on such testimony.” 
However, in relation to juries (which sit in IP cases in the US but no longer 
elsewhere), surely the recent, somewhat tawdry pronouncements of the patent-
owning foreman of the jury after the jury’s finding of liability in the Apple-
Samsung case in California highlight well the dangers referred to by the Law 
Reform Committee. 
16 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed, as amended by s 8 of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2012 
(Act 4 of 2012). For a recent commentary on the changes, see Chen Siyuan, “The 
2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act: More Questions than Answers as 
Regards Expert Opinion Evidence” [2013] Statute Law Review <http://slr. 
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/03/11/slr.hmt003.abstract> (last accessed  
19 August 2013). 
17 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 10. In the following 
paragraph, the Law Reform Committee explains its recommendation: to change 
the basis of admissibility of expert evidence from one of “necessity” to that of 
“assistance” as long as the court thinks it likely to derive “substantial” assistance 
(the Law Reform Committee suggested this would avoid too much or marginally 
helpful expert evidence being adduced but the word “substantial” was not included 
in the amending legislation) and to broaden the types of evidence which may be 
admitted under the provision, provided there remains an overriding discretion for 
the court “to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it is unfairly prejudicial, 
misleading or confusing or will lead to an undue waste of judicial time” (although 
it does not suggest the wording for such an exclusionary discretion, that would 
apply to all forms of evidence and not just expert evidence, at para 11(d)). It is 
respectfully submitted that through its more general wording, the recommended 
amendment would make a welcome move away from the somewhat surprising 
notion suggested by the current wording that it is the court that has to form an 
opinion: what the court has to do is make findings of law on the basis of the 
(admissible) evidence. 
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12 The LRC Report highlights18 that the “idiosyncratic sense” of the 
word “relevant” in s 47 (in its pre-amendment and current form) is 
“admissible”, rather than “rationally probative”, which is the sense in 
which it is used in what the LRC Report labels as “modern evidence law” 
elsewhere.19 By way of example, the LRC Report refers to s 55(1) of the 
Australian Evidence Act 199520 which defines “relevant evidence” as that 
which “if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) 
the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the 
proceedings”.21 In view of this idiosyncratic sense, the LRC Report 
cautions that it is important to “never lose sight of this fundamental 
difference between our evidence law and that of most other foreign 
jurisdictions … [and] to bear this essential difference in mind when 
translating into the local context principles drawn from cases, articles 
and law reform reports from foreign jurisdictions which adopt the 
modern approach to the law of evidence”.22 
13 Even though he or she may be called as an expert by one of the 
parties to a dispute, and paid by them for doing so, an expert’s primary 
duty under O 40A, r 2 of the Rules of Court23 is to assist the court and 
this duty overrides whatever obligation is owed to the party calling the 
expert.24 In addition, it is clear from the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal in HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin 
Development Singapore Pte Ltd,25 involving valuation expert evidence, 
                                                                       
18 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 17. 
19 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 19. 
20 Act 2 of 1995. 
21 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 22. 
22 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 36. 
23 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. 
24 However, in Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13, as one of the 
majority of the Supreme Court which decided to abolish the longstanding 
immunity against suit for professional negligence of expert witnesses, Lord Dyson 
held (at [122]) that, notwithstanding his duty to the court, “an expert engaged for 
reward does owe a duty of care to his client”. It is respectfully submitted that a 
Singapore court deciding the same issue should give particular weight to the views 
of the minority, Lord Hope and Lady Hale, the latter who emphasised at [189] that: 
[t]he major concern … is not about the effect of making the exception [to the 
general rule of immunity for witnesses] upon expert witnesses. If they are 
truly expert professionals, they should not allow any of this to affect their 
behaviour. The major concern is about the effect upon disappointed litigants. 
I agree with Lord Hope that the object of the rule is to protect all witnesses, 
the great majority of whom are trying to do a professional job and are well 
aware of their duties to the court, against the understandable but usually 
unjustifiable desire of a disappointed litigant to blame someone else for his 
lack of success in court. 
25 [2012] 4 SLR 738. 
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that experts should as a matter of legal principle disclose “without any 
prompting” any existing or recent relationship with any of the parties.26 
“A failure to make proper disclosure in a timely manner may raise 
serious concerns about apparent or actual bias on the part of the 
expert”27 that could lead to the evidence being discounted. 
III. Procedure for the admission of expert evidence 
14 Order 40A of the Rules of Court28 sets out the requirements for 
the form in which expert evidence may be submitted: 
(1) Unless the Court otherwise directs, expert evidence is to be 
given in a written report signed by the expert and exhibited in an 
affidavit sworn to or affirmed by him testifying that the report 
exhibited is his and that he accepts full responsibility for the report. 
(2) An expert’s report must — 
(a) give details of the expert’s qualifications; 
(b) give details of any literature or other material which 
the expert witness has relied on in making the report; 
(c) contain a statement setting out the issues which he 
has been asked to consider and the basis upon which the 
evidence was given; 
(d) if applicable, state the name and qualifications of 
the person who carried out any test or experiment which the 
expert has used for the report and whether or not such test or 
experiment has been carried out under the expert’s 
supervision; 
(e) where there is a range of opinion on the matters 
dealt with in the report — 
                                                                       
26 In England, see also on this issue, Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd 
[2007] EWHC 464 (Comm), a case in which it was proposed that an employee 
should give expert evidence. In ruling that to do so was not improper in that 
particular case, Aikens J was impressed by the steps that had been taken to ensure 
independence – the employee had had the benefit of independent legal advice on 
his role, there was an open declaration of his position, there was an undertaking by 
the employer not to influence him (paraphrasing slightly), he was aware of his duty 
to the court and keen to perform it, and experts in the area were scarce. It was, 
however, noted by Mann J in Meat Corp of Namibia Ltd v Dawn Meats (UK) Ltd 
[2011] EWHC 474 (Ch) at [58] that “[i]t does not follow that those steps are 
necessary in any other case …”. 
27 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore 
Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 at [71]. See also generally Jeffrey Pinsler, “Expert’s Duty 
to be Truthful in the light of the Rules of Court” (2004) 16 SAcLJ 407. 
28 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. 
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(i) summarise the range of opinion; and 
(ii) give reasons for his opinion; 
(f) contain a summary of the conclusions reached; 
(g) contain a statement of belief of correctness of the 
expert’s opinion; and 
(h) contain a statement that the expert understands that 
in giving his report, his duty is to the Court and that he 
complies with that duty.[29] 
15 In England, the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR”)30 provide 
that the starting point in relation to expert evidence is that it “be 
restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the 
proceedings” (r 35.1). Additionally, the court’s permission must be 
obtained before expert evidence may be adduced: 
35.4 
(1) No party may call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s 
report without the court’s permission. 
(2) When a party applies for permission under this rule he must 
identify – 
(a) the field in which he wishes to rely on expert 
evidence; and 
(b) where practicable the expert in that field on whose 
evidence he wishes to rely. 
(3) If permission is granted under this rule it shall be in relation 
only to the expert named or the field identified under paragraph (2). 
(4) The court may limit the amount of the expert’s fees and 
expenses that the party who wishes to rely on the expert may recover 
from any other party. 
16 In a copyright case in England that preceded the Woolf reforms 
and the CPR, Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd 
(“Cala Homes”),31 Laddie J criticised trenchantly the views expressed in 
“The Expert Witness: Partisan with a Conscience”, an article in the 
August 1990 Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators by Francis 
Goodall, a distinguished expert (and Fellow of the Chartered Institute). 
He had suggested that it was appropriate for an expert to act as a “hired 
                                                                       
29 Jeffrey Pinsler, “Expert’s Duty to be Truthful in the light of the Rules of Court” 
(2004) 16 SAcLJ 407 at 422 suggests that “[t]he distinction between a ‘court expert’ 
[appointed very rarely under O 40] and a ‘party’s expert’ [appointed under 
O 40A] … gives the unintended impression that one is independent and the other 
is not. It foments an improper view of the nature of expert testimony”. 
30 SI 1998/3132. 
31 [1995] FSR 818. 
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gun” unless and until he found himself in court (which he noted 
“happens more rarely than is acknowledged in much of the comment 
on expert witness work”) where “the earlier pragmatic flexibility is 
brought under a sharp curb, whether of conscience, or fear of perjury, or 
fear of losing professional credibility. It is no longer enough for the 
expert like the ‘virtuous youth’ in the Mikado to ‘tell the truth whenever 
he finds it pays’: shades of moral and other constraints begin to close up 
on him.” 
17 Laddie J’s response was that:32 
The judge is not a rustic who has chosen to play a game of Three Card 
Trick [Goodall had suggested that such a man is not cheating, nor 
does he incur any moral approbrium, when he uses sleight of hand to 
deceive the eye of the innocent rustic]. He is not fair game. Nor is the 
truth. 
18 With respect to the judge’s view, which is obviously 
incontrovertible, it is by no means clear that Goodall was suggesting 
otherwise: his point appears to have been the more subtle one that in 
most cases, because they do not reach trial, the use of experts is limited 
to the early, pre-trial stages of litigation that usually lead to a settlement 
of one form or another (or abandonment of the claim before trial) and 
that the expert should be free to perform as a hired gun (deceiving the 
eyes of the innocent rustics on the other side) in those stages without 
prejudice to his or her obligations vis-à-vis evidence to be adduced at 
trial. However, it is very difficult to see how a line can sensibly be drawn 
between evidence used in the pre-trial stages of litigation and that used 
and cross-examined at trial. 
19 In Jones v Kaney,33 a road traffic accident case, in which by a 
majority of 5:2 the former absolute immunity from suit for professional 
negligence of (“friendly” rather than adverse)34 expert witnesses was 
abolished by the UK Supreme Court, Lord Phillips commented that 
Laddie J in Cala Homes had been:35 
rightly critical of the approach of this expert. There is no longer any 
scope, if indeed there ever was, for contrasting the duty owed by an 
expert to his client with a different duty to the court, which replaces 
the former, once the witness gets into court. In response to  
Lord Woolf ’s recommendations on access to justice the CPR now spell 
                                                                       
32 Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd [1995] FSR 818  
at 842–843. The judge proceeded to remind those preparing expert reports of the 
importance of independence and objectivity, citing from the judgment of Cresswell 
J in The Ikarian Reefer [1993] FSR 563 at 565. 
33 [2011] UKSC 13. 
34 Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 at [71]–[73], per Lord Collins. 
35 Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 at [49]–[50]. 
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out in detail the duties to which expert witnesses are subject including, 
where so directed, a duty to meet and, where possible, reach 
agreement with the expert on the other side. At the end of every 
expert’s report the writer has to state that he understands and has 
complied with his duty to the court. Where an expert witness is 
retained, it is likely to be, as it was in the present case, on terms that 
the expert will perform the functions specified in the CPR. The expert 
agrees with his client that he will perform the duties that he owes to 
the court. Thus there is no conflict between the duty that the expert 
owes to his client and the duty that he owes to the court. Furthermore, 
a term is implied into the contract under section 13 of the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982, that the expert will exercise reasonable 
skill and care in carrying out the contractual services. 
Thus the expert witness has this in common with the advocate. Each 
undertakes a duty to provide services to the client. In each case those 
services include a paramount duty to the court and the public, which 
may require the advocate or the witness to act in a way which does not 
advance the client’s case. The advocate must disclose to the court 
authorities that are unfavourable to his client. The expert witness must 
give his evidence honestly, even if this involves concessions that are 
contrary to his client’s interests. The expert witness has far more in 
common with the advocate than he does with the witness of fact. 
20 In practice, expert evidence primarily adduced for the purpose 
of setting out the expert’s opinion will often include factual evidence 
that may be drawn from the expert’s general experience.36 Strictly, such 
evidence should not be admitted as it is hearsay, although in England 
the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence was abolished for 
civil cases (although not for criminal) by s 5 of the Civil Evidence Act 
1995.37 However, the LRC Report notes that a more liberal attitude tends 
to be adopted as “different considerations arise in cases of expert 
evidence where some reference to hearsay materials should be allowed as 
opposed to evidence of fact where the hearsay rule should be strictly 
observed.”38 In Gema Metal Ceilings (Far East) v Iwatani Techno 
                                                                       
36 See, for example, the comments of Megarry J in English Exporters (London) Ltd v 
Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415, a valuation case cited by the Law Reform 
Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform Committee on 
Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at paras 254 and 257, accepting the admissibility 
of such evidence but going on to say “it seems to me quite another matter [and it 
should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay] when it is asserted that a valuer may 
give factual evidence of transactions of which he has no direct knowledge”: this 
could well apply to trade mark infringement and passing off cases in which there is 
a tendency to hear retail experts in relation to, for example, the likelihood of 
confusion. 
37 c 38. 
38 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 258. 
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Construction (M) Sdn Bhd,39 Chan Seng Onn JC (as his Honour then 
was) noted:40 
I recognise that most experts frequently employ hearsay to some 
degree in forming their views. In fact, as a matter of convenience, 
courts have sometimes tended not to insist upon proof of the extrinsic 
materials customarily employed by experts to perform their work, 
namely understanding obtained from use of professional libraries and 
knowledge acquired in the discharge of professional duties. 
21 Where relying on such general experience and extrinsic 
materials, the expert is required by O 40A r 3(2)(a) of the Rules of 
Court41 to indicate this is so. 
IV. Patent cases 
22 By their very nature, practically all patent cases involve technical 
issues on which the judge will expect assistance from expert witnesses, 
on both sides.42 In Singapore, the danger of not providing such 
assistance was made clear in an application to revoke a patent, where the 
judge noted that a failure by the party making the attack to adduce 
expert evidence on how the person skilled in the art would have viewed 
the claims “does not mean that a court … will simply substitute its own 
judgment” rather than rely on the views of the patentee’s expert 
witness.43 
23 However, it must always be borne in mind that expert witnesses 
can only assist the court; it is for the tribunal to decide the questions 
of law and it should not delegate that task to the expert witnesses, 
however eminent or persuasive. In the words of Jacob LJ in the English 
Court of Appeal:44 
Their primary function is to educate the court in the technology – 
they come as teachers, as makers of the mantle for the court to don. 
For that purpose it does not matter whether they do or do not 
                                                                       
39 [2000] SGHC 37. 
40 Gema Metal Ceilings (Far East) v Iwatani Techno Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2000] 
SGHC 37 at [74]. 
41 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. 
42 In England, this will often include a “primer” in the technology concerned, agreed 
between the parties’ experts. 
43 In Martek Biosciences Corp v Cargill International Trading Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 482 
at [56], per Tay Yong Kwang J, when overturning the decision of a patents tribunal 
of the IP Office of Singapore to revoke a claim on the ground that it lacked 
inventive step, despite the absence of expert evidence adduced by the applicant for 
revocation on whether it would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art 
to “mosaic” (or read together) two different documents in the prior art. 
44 Technip France SA’s Patent [2004] RPC 46 at [43], per Jacob LJ (CA). 
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approximate to the skilled man. What matters is that they are good at 
explaining things. 
24 Drawing an analogy with the test applied to expert evidence in 
relation to professional negligence – what matters is not what the 
individual expert witness says he personally would have done, but 
whether the conduct said to be negligent falls short of what a reasonable 
professional would have done45 – the same judge noted in relation to the 
question (not one of law but of fact) as to what would have been 
“obvious” to the person skilled in the art:46 
… it is not so much the expert’s personal view but his reasons for that 
view – these the court can examine against the standard of the 
notional unimaginative skilled man.[47] 
25 In that context, he cautioned:48 
… a judge should be careful to distinguish his views on the experts as 
to whether they are good witnesses or good teachers – good at 
answering the questions asked and not others, not argumentative and 
so on, from the more fundamental reasons for their opinions. 
Ultimately it is the latter which matter – are they reasons which would 
be perceived by the skilled man? 
26 Thus, the expert’s role is to assist the court in its task of viewing 
the patent claims through the eyes of the person skilled in the art at the 
time the patent was applied for.49 The expert need not himself be skilled 
in the art in question, although he usually is. Likewise, he need not be 
independent50 (he could be an employee in appropriate circumstances)51 
                                                                       
45 As laid down by McNair J in Bolam v Freiern Hospital Management Committee 
[1957] 1 WLR 582. 
46 Pfizer Ltd’s Patent [2001] FSR 201 at [62], per Laddie J: 
This is not a real person. He is a legal creation. He is supposed to offer an 
objective test of whether a particular development can be protected by a 
patent. He is deemed to have looked at and read publicly available documents 
and to know of public uses in the prior art. He understands all languages and 
dialects. He never misses the obvious nor stumbles on the inventive. He has 
no private idiosyncratic preferences or dislikes. He never thinks laterally. He 
differs from all real people in one or more of these characteristics. 
47 SmithKline Beecham PLC v Apotex Europe Ltd [2005] FSR 23 at [52]. 
48 SmithKline Beecham PLC v Apotex Europe Ltd [2005] FSR 23 at [53]. 
49 The task as described by Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion 
Roussel Ltd [2005] RPC 9, adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in FE Global 
Electronics Pte Ltd v Trek Technology (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR 874 at [14]. 
50 It was noted by Tay Yong Kwang J in Martek Biosciences Corp v Cargill 
International Trading Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 482 at [46] that in cases involving very 
specific technology, it is “not surprising if only a limited number of experts are 
available, such that pre-eminent experts may have certain work experience which 
might at first sight appear to threaten their independence”. 
51 In Mühlbauer AG v Manufacturing Integration Technology Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 724, 
the expert witness was one of the inventors of a patent relied on by the defendant 
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although he usually is in order to avoid accusations of bias.52 Indeed, in 
the words of Andrew Phang JA in Mühlbauer AG v Manufacturing 
Integration Technology Ltd,53 “[t]he difficulties engendered by the issue of 
bias with regard to experts for the respective parties are, unfortunately, 
perennial in nature”.54 It was noted by the judge that it had been 
suggested by counsel for the patentee that a new system involving 
impartial assessors should be considered because “possible (or even 
probable) bias of experts is an especially significant one in patent 
cases”.55 Whilst expressing no firm view (“it might well be the case … 
[but] it is obviously also significant with respect to all other areas of the 
law as well”) on whether the latter contention is correct, the judge 
referred to the possibility of the parties applying to the court to appoint 
an impartial and objective expert under the powers already contained in 
O 40 r 1 and remarked that “it may well be wise and prudent … in 
future cases (especially of this nature)”.56 However, this remark does not 
seem to have been acted upon by parties in subsequent patent cases. 
27 Above all, the expert must realise that he is not an advocate for 
the position adopted by the party retaining him: “his advocacy is limited 
                                                                                                                               
in its counterclaim for invalidity and his evidence was relied on heavily by the trial 
judge, who found the patent in issue to be invalid, but did not find such favour in 
the Court of Appeal, which reversed the trial judge’s finding of invalidity. In 
Forensic Telecommunications Services Ltd v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police 
[2012] FSR 15 at [7], a copyright infringement and breach of confidence case, 
Arnold J confirmed that “the mere fact that [the witness] is employed by [the 
plaintiff] does not debar him from giving expert evidence on its behalf”, although 
he emphasised that the fact “made it all the more important” to adhere to the 
requirements of CPR r 35.10 and the Practice Direction Pt 35 – Experts and 
Assessors and the Protocol for the Instruction of Experts to Give Evidence in Civil 
Cases. 
52 In Asia Hotel Investments Ltd v Starwood Asia Pacific Management Pte Ltd [2007] 
SGHC 50 at [206]–[207], it was observed that in deciding whether an expert’s 
evidence should be discounted, the test is actual partiality rather than an 
appearance of partiality. 
53 [2010] 2 SLR 724 at [44]. 
54 The learned judge referred to his own detailed comments on the subject in the 
earlier case of Khoo Bee Keong v Ang Chun Hong [2005] SGHC 128 at [68]  
and [82]–[87]. In that case, the judge noted at [84] that “one cannot be faulted for 
taking the views just expressed, with respect to the expert’s duty to the court and to 
justice, with the proverbial pinch of salt, especially when one views this proposition 
through the lenses of practical reality”. In the UK Supreme Court case of Jones v 
Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13, see n 24 above, Lord Collins said at [81]: 
“[t]he reality is that an expert retained by one party is not an unbiased witness, and 
the threat of liability for negligence may encourage more careful and reliable 
evaluation of the case by the expert.” 
55 Mühlbauer AG v Manufacturing Integration Technology Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 724  
at [45]. 
56 Mühlbauer AG v Manufacturing Integration Technology Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 724  
at [45]. The learned judge also noted at [45] that the same rule permits the court to 
appoint one or more independent experts of its own motion, although he 
considered “this particular avenue will probably prove less than practical”. 
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to supporting his independent views and not his client’s cause”.57 This is 
an important distinction that some experts fail to grasp.58 Nor is the 
expert there to offer his opinion on whether or not there is 
infringement: his role is to guide the court as to the meaning of 
technical terms or what exactly is disclosed by the prior art.59 It is a 
question of law for the judge whether there is infringement. (In this 
context, it is respectfully submitted that when V K Rajah JA stated in 
First Currency Choice Pte Ltd v Main-Line Corporate Holdings Ltd60 that 
“[t]here was clear evidence from the respondent’s expert witness … that 
the FCC system infringed the Patent”,61 what he meant was that there 
was clear evidence on which the trial judge could find infringement; 
likewise, when the learned judge proceeded to characterise the issue of 
infringement as a question of fact, he must be taken to have meant that 
the legal question of what constitutes infringement is one that is 
answered on the basis of the facts.) 
28 In Pfizer Ltd’s Patent,62 Laddie J addressed the problem of 
choosing an expert who is too expert:63 
In most substantial patent cases the technology at issue is 
sophisticated and the witnesses called are experts in their fields. In 
most cases, of which this is a good example, they are either renowned 
academics or researchers who have been immersed in the research and 
development departments of major companies. In either case they 
come to the issues not only with profound understanding of the 
technology but also frequently with knowledge of additional private 
and relevant information which is not deemed to be known to the 
notional addressee [ie, the person skilled in the art]. 
                                                                       
57 Vita Health Laboratories Pte Ltd v Pang Seng Meng [2004] SLR(R) 162 at [83], 
per V K Rajah J (as he then was), in a case which involved tangentially the 
exploitation of IP rights. 
58 In his Foreword to The Expert Witness Institute’s Experts in the Civil Courts 
(Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC ed) (Oxford University Press, 2006), Sir Anthony 
Clarke MR goes further and comments that “[partisanship] seems to me to be 
inevitable. It is inevitable because it is human nature”. 
59 The principle that unless the trial judge has erred in principle, an appellate court 
should be slow to interfere with findings of fact in relation to obviousness, known 
as the Biogen principle [1997] RPC 1 (HL), also applies to a trial judge’s preference 
for one expert over another if there is a conflict of expert testimony on the 
meaning of a technical term or what has been disclosed by the prior art:  
per Jacob LJ in SmithKline Beecham plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2005] FSR 23 at [36]. 
60 [2007] SGCA 50. 
61 [2007] SGCA 50 at [82]. 
62 [2001] FSR 201. 
63 Pfizer Ltd’s Patent [2001] FSR 201 at [64]. Later in his judgment, Laddie J came to 
the conclusion that the evidence given by Ignarro, a Nobel Laureate expert witness 
called by Pfizer, resulted from the witness’s scepticism as a result of his personal 
experience (at [146]) and did not represent the approach of “the skilled  
non-inventive addressee” of the patent (at [145]). 
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29 As the role of the expert witness in a particular case may be to 
assist the court in seeing the patent specification and particularly the 
claims through the eyes of the notional skilled person at the time of the 
patent application, including assisting in explaining what was common 
general knowledge at that time, the judge cautioned that it can be 
dangerous to rely on the evidence of a witness who may have fixed and 
perhaps unrepresentative views by reason of their very brilliance and 
eminence in the technical field in question:64 
If a genius in a field misses a particular development over a piece of 
prior art, it could be because he missed the obvious, as clever people 
sometimes do, or because it was inventive. Similarly credible evidence 
from him that he saw or would have seen the development may be 
attributable to the fact that it is obvious or that it was inventive and he 
is clever enough to have seen it. So evidence from him does not prove 
that the development is obvious or not. It may be valuable in that it 
will help the court to understand the technology and how it could or 
might lead to the development. 
30 On similar lines, Andrew Phang JA in Mühlbauer AG v 
Manufacturing Integration Technology Ltd65 warned that “many experts 
would not themselves fall within this particular category of persons 
‘skilled in the art’ as they would possess extraordinary knowledge as well 
as expertise” and cautioned counsel and, if necessary, the court to 
remind experts of this danger. 
31 After all, it is not only expert witnesses who sometimes lose 
sight of common sense or the opposite and perhaps more sensible view 
of the non-specialist. By way of example, cited here is the patent case of 
Nichia Corp v Argos Ltd66 in the English Court of Appeal, in which the 
two non-specialist judges, Rix and Pill LJJ, disagreed, respectfully but 
firmly, with their IP-specialist brother judge, Jacob LJ, whose judgment 
proposed curtailed disclosure (discovery) on what the inventor had 
actually done. 
32 In an explanation redolent of a Charles Dickens lament about 
the 19th century English legal (and patent) system,67 Jacob LJ had this to 
                                                                       
64 Pfizer Ltd’s Patent [2001] FSR 201 at [63]. 
65 [2010] 2 SLR 724 at [48]. 
66 [2007] FSR 38. 
67 Not only did Dickens’ description of Chancery in Bleak House put the English legal 
system in a very bad light, but so did his less well-known work, A Poor Man’s Tale 
of a Patent, which tells of the trials and tribulations of a 56-year-old patent 
applicant, who concludes, “Is it reasonable to make a man feel as if, in inventing an 
ingenious improvement meant to do good, he had done something wrong? How 
else can a man feel, when he is met by such difficulties at every turn? All inventors 
taking out a Patent MUST feel so. And look at the expense. How hard on me, and 
how hard on the country if there’s any merit in me (and my invention is took up 
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say about why disclosure (discovery) in this area results inevitably in 
significant expense for both plaintiff and defendant:68 
Following SKM, disclosure of inventor’s records became routine. No 
one doubts that it has very considerably increased the expense of 
patent actions. Consider what is involved. First the documents have to 
be searched for and identified. This will involve reading them not only 
by the lawyers but also perhaps by an expert or experts whose 
assistance in understanding may be needed. The expert may come 
from within the client, or may be an outside expert. Both sorts of 
expert may be involved. The inventor may be called in if available to 
explain his documents. Normally several lawyers and a patent agent 
may be required. The relevant may be sifted from the irrelevant. Often 
translation will be involved. When all this has been done the 
documents are disclosed. The other side’s lawyers aided by their 
experts crawl all over them. As is usual they look for references to 
documents mentioned but not disclosed. This leads to enquiries about 
missing documents and disputes about that. Not infrequently there are 
disputes about confidentiality and the formation of complicated 
‘confidentiality clubs’ of designated lawyers, patent agents and 
independent experts, not to mention painfully detailed work on 
redaction of material said to be irrelevant. On both sides many, many 
hours are spent and many pages are involved. Not infrequently the 
whole lot ends up being copied for trial. 
And all for what? Only ‘secondary evidence’ which must be kept 
‘firmly in its place’ [in the words of Sir Donald Nicholls VC in 
Mölnlycke [1994] RPC 49 (CA) at 113]. 
33 However, the two non-specialists were, with the “greatest 
diffidence and reluctance” (per Rix LJ), unable to accept that there 
needed to be a special rule for patent cases, although they agreed 
wholeheartedly with him on the importance of seeking to avoid 
unnecessary and disproportionate expense. In the words of Pill LJ:69 
Patent infringement disputes obviously have features of their own but 
they are but one species of a very wide range of commercial disputes 
which come before the courts. It would not inspire confidence if 
businesses and their advisers were met with different standards of 
disclosure depending on the type of dispute involved … 
                                                                                                                               
now, I am thankful to say, and doing well), to put me to all that expense before I 
can move a finger!” 
68 Nichia Corp v Argos Ltd [2007] FSR 38 at [36]. 
69 Nichia Corp v Argos Ltd [2007] FSR 38 at [83] and [88], respectively. Retired 
English High Court judge Sir Oliver Popplewell has commented of the role of the 
judge in medical negligence cases, in Hallmark: A Judge’s life at Oxford (IB Tauris & 
Co, 2009) at p 88: “Sometimes the views of two equally distinguished experts 
conflicted and in this case it was never an easy task for the layman, which is what 
the judge is, to determine not where the truth lay (because the experts were both 
honest witnesses) but where the line should be drawn.” 
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… 
I obviously express views on experts in this field with diffidence, in 
light of Jacob L.J.’s experience, but the need to scrutinise their evidence 
in the interests of justice and to have the appropriate tools with which 
to do so, appears to me to be no different in this field from that in the 
many other fields, with which most members of this court have wide 
experience, in which expert evidence is called. 
V. Registered design cases 
34 Despite the fact that both patents and registered designs are 
monopoly rights issued by a granting authority under a detailed 
statutory regime, compared with cases involving patents, there ought to 
be relatively less scope for adducing expert evidence in a registered 
design infringement case, accompanied though it may be by the usual 
counterclaim for invalidity. 
35 According to Jacob LJ, in a registered design case in England, all 
that the court has to do is compare the registered design with the 
allegedly infringing product and decide if there is any relevant prior art, 
“[a]nd the most important thing about each of these is what they look 
like”.70 
36 Thus:71 
[i]t follows that a place for evidence is very limited indeed. By and 
large it should be possible to decide a registered design case in a few 
hours … The evidence of experts, particularly about consumer 
products, is unlikely to be of much assistance: anyone can point out 
similarities and differences, though an educated eye can sometimes 
help a bit. Sometimes there may be a piece of technical evidence which 
is relevant – eg, that design freedom is limited by certain constraints. 
But even so that is usually more or less self-evident and certainly 
unlikely to be controversial to the point of a need for cross-
examination, still less substantial cross-examination. 
37 Although today the law of registered designs is different in 
material respects in Singapore,72 there is no reason why this approach 
                                                                       
70 Procter & Gamble Co v Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Ltd [2008] FSR 8 (CA) at [3]. 
71 Procter & Gamble Co v Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Ltd [2008] FSR 8 (CA) at [4], 
per Jacob LJ. The judge proceeded to cite Thermos Ltd v Aladdin Sales & Marketing 
Ltd [2000] FSR 402 at 404, in which he had expressed the view that “the court 
should take care before allowing any expert evidence [in registered design cases]”, 
as “[i]f blanket permission is given, each side feels compelled to get an expert who 
then has to say something. What is then said has to be read by the other side. 
Thereby time and cost to no particular use is expended”. 
72 See the magisterial work by George Wei, Industrial Design Law in Singapore 
(Academy Publishing, 2012) and particularly his treatment of the fact that the first 
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would not be followed here in cases concerning designs registered under 
the Registered Designs Act.73 
38 By way of example, in Nagasima Electronic Engineering Pte Ltd v 
APH Trading Pte Ltd,74 the first case decided under the new Singapore 
registered design law, Lai Kew Chai J did not need expert evidence to 
assist in his consideration of the novelty of the registered design for an 
electrical isolator, mostly installed in HDB flats, although he did:75 
… take judicial notice of the fact that connectors of all shapes, 
including right-angled shapes, have been in existence for a very long 
time, not just in the electrical field but in other fields such as 
plumbing. The connectors are right-angled to connect two items 
where a direct or straight connection is not possible. 
VI. Passing off and trade mark cases 
39 In Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts Worldwide Inc,76 which concerned the trade mark “St Regis” 
registered in relation to, inter alia, hotel services and a subsequent 
application to register “Park Regis” for the same services, Judith 
Prakash J refused permission to adduce in evidence letters from travel 
agents who stated they had not witnessed any confusion between the 
two marks, applying the rule against hearsay evidence and relying on 
Soon Peck Wah v Woon Che Chye.77 
                                                                                                                               
Singapore statute for the registration of designs in Singapore, the Registered 
Designs Act (Cap 266, 2005 Rev Ed) (“RDA”), does not, unlike the earlier UK Acts 
which were extended to Singapore (a process described by the then Minister of 
State for Law, Professor Ho Peng Kee, as “circuitous, time-consuming and costly”, 
cited by Wei (at para 2.3)), contain the requirement that the design have eye 
appeal. Wei concludes (at para 2.41) that “[t]here is no doubt that under the 
Singapore RDA, features of design are still concerned with visual appearance”, 
while emphasising at para 2.51 the greater importance than hitherto of the 
exclusion from registrability of functional features contained in s 2(1) of the RDA; 
indeed, he notes (at para 2.42) that the exclusion could be extended beyond 
“features of shape or configuration” to include “patterns (dictated solely by 
function)”. 
73 Cap 266, 2005 Rev Ed. 
74 [2005] 2 SLR(R) 641; Registered Designs Act (Cap 266, 2005 Rev Ed): although it 
concerned a design registered in the UK under the previous legislation, the 
Registered Designs Act’s transitional provisions deemed it to be a registered design 
under the Registered Designs Act. 
75 Nagasima Electronic Engineering Pte Ltd v APH Trading Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 641 
at [20]. 
76 [2013] 1 SLR 489. 
77 [1997] 3 SLR(R) 430, although it should be noted that Jeffrey Pinsler, in Evidence 
and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2010), suggests that the Court of 
Appeal in that case was in error when it stated, at [27], that “[i]n Singapore, the 
rule against hearsay is reflected in s 62 of the Evidence Act”. He notes (at para 4.06) 
that the section does not formulate the rule against hearsay as it “omits the 
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40 Given that the test for infringement of a trade mark “has to be 
looked at globally taking into account all the circumstances”78 through 
the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question,79 
it can be questioned how much expert witnesses can and should assist 
the court in that assessment, particularly in cases where the goods or 
services are ones that are come across frequently in daily life. Thus, in 
Hai Tong Co (Pte) Ltd v Ventree Singapore Pte Ltd,80 the Singapore Court 
of Appeal made it clear that while evidence of actual confusion “can be 
very helpful [in answering the question for the court of whether there is 
likely to be confusion], its absence should not be accorded undue 
significance”81 and was certainly not “fatal to the claim [of trade mark 
infringement]”,82 which the court upheld. Nevertheless, in both 
Singapore and England, expert evidence is admitted not infrequently 
even in such cases. 
41 For example, in the English High Court in D Jacobson & Sons 
Ltd v Globe Ltd,83 Etherton J heard the evidence of the plaintiff ’s expert, 
Tom Blackett,84 that “typical buyers of trainers would be likely to take 
the [plaintiff ’s] Wing Flash logo as the manufacturer’s brand rather than 
serving a mere decorative purpose”.85 In turn, the defendant relied 
heavily on another expert whose opinion was that “unless educated 
otherwise, consumers are likely to consider stripes on the side of trainers 
as being nothing more than design features rather than brand logos; and 
that, in order to make design features themselves a recognised brand, an 
organisation would have to work on branding and marketing.”86 It is 
surely difficult for any objective observer to understand why it requires 
experts to give such blinding glimpses of the obvious. However, the 
judge concluded that “the weight of the [other] evidence supports 
Blackett’s views”;87 a conclusion that raises the interesting question, was 
it necessary then? While the plaintiff in that case had a turnover of 
                                                                                                                               
distinction between assertions tendered as evidence of the facts referred to and 
statements which are relevant by virtue of having been made”. Obviously, the 
evidence in Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide Inc [2013] 1 SLR 489 fell within the former category and therefore was 
properly excluded by Judith Prakash J under the rule. 
78 The Polo/Lauren Co, LP v Shop In Department Store Pte Ltd [2006] 2 SLR(R) 690  
at [28]. 
79 In some ways, the trade mark law equivalent of the patent system’s “person skilled 
in the art”. 
80 [2013] 2 SLR 941. 
81 Hai Tong Co (Pte) Ltd v Ventree Singapore Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 941 at [100]. 
82 Hai Tong Co (Pte) Ltd v Ventree Singapore Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 941 at [106]. 
83 [2008] FSR 21. 
84 Who appears regularly as an expert witness in trade mark and passing off cases in 
England. 
85 [2008] FSR 21 at [133]. 
86 [2008] FSR 21 at [110]. 
87 [2008] FSR 21 at [134]. 
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approximately £70m and the defendant was a subsidiary of a company 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, so presumably both could easily 
afford the increased costs, it is a legitimate concern whether a less 
pecunious defendant, or even plaintiff, would have been able to and 
would therefore have settled early or foresworn resort to legal 
proceedings, respectively. 
42 As observed by Tan Tee Jim in Law of Trade Marks and Passing 
Off in Singapore88 in relation to survey evidence but equally applicable 
here, “the absence or inadequacy of such evidence only means that the 
court will have to examine any other evidence adduced, and rely on its 
own examination of the marks, to determine if there is a likelihood of 
confusion.”89 
43 At this juncture, it is also worthwhile recalling the words of 
Millett LJ in The European Ltd v The Economist Newspaper Ltd:90 
It is legitimate to call evidence from persons skilled in a particular 
market to explain any special features of that market of which the 
judge may otherwise be ignorant and which may be relevant to the 
likelihood of confusion. It is not legitimate to call such witnesses 
merely in order to give their opinions whether the two signs are 
confusingly similar. They are experts in the market, not on confusing 
similarity. 
44 In Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off in Singapore, Tan cites the 
above and suggests that, despite the warning, “there is merit in 
admitting evidence from trade witnesses and allowing the judge to 
decide from the totality of the evidence presented to him”.91 It is 
respectfully submitted in response that it is also in the interests both of 
speedy and cost-effective justice and of keeping the doors of the courts 
open to the not very wealthy as well as the deep-pocketed that judges do 
not allow the admission of expert evidence in areas where they are 
perfectly capable of relying on their own experience. As Rothstein J said 
when giving the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles Inc:92 
In light of the relatively extensive expert evidence in this case, and the 
difficulties with the evidence that I discuss below, I think it is timely to 
recall that litigation is costly. Courts must fulfil their gatekeeper role to 
ensure that unnecessary, irrelevant and potentially distracting expert 
and survey evidence is not allowed to extend and complicate court 
                                                                       
88 Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2nd Ed, 2005. 
89 Tan Tee Jim, Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell 
Asia, 2nd Ed, 2005) at para 6.44. 
90 [1998] FSR 89 (CA) at 291. 
91 Tan Tee Jim, Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell 
Asia, 2nd Ed, 2005) at para 6.43. 
92 [2011] 2 SCR 387 at [76]. 
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proceedings. While this observation applies generally, I focus 
particularly on trade-mark confusion cases.[93] 
45 Litigation is costly not only in Canada, it is also costly in 
England and Singapore. The cost is increased further when the parties 
are permitted by the court to engage in a battle of experts without 
serious consideration of whether, or to what extent, it is necessary or 
just to do so. 
46 After more than 25 years’ practice in the IP field in England, the 
author is confident in asserting without empirical evidence that expert 
evidence for use in IP proceedings there is both expensive to obtain and 
expensive for the other party to argue against, thus, its relevance and 
probative value should always be scrutinised carefully. 
47 In England, such cost concerns have led recently to careful 
consideration of the need for a particular form of expert evidence, 
namely survey evidence, in the closely related fields of passing off and 
trade marks. In the former, it is for the court and the court alone to 
decide whether deception and thereby harm to the plaintiff ’s goodwill 
has been caused by the defendant’s activities, in the latter it is for the 
court to decide whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the 
registered mark and the defendant’s sign. 
A. Survey evidence 
48 Expert evidence adduced in support of a claim of trade mark 
infringement and/or passing off often takes the form of a survey (the 
results of which are exhibited to the statement of the expert witness who 
has devised and supervised the carrying out of the survey) and it has 
become almost standard practice to have such surveys carried out. 
Despite this, reviewing the authorities in both Singapore and England, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that few cases turn on the weight 
given to survey evidence. When the survey evidence supports the judge’s 
view on deception or the likelihood of confusion gleaned from all the 
other evidence, it is referred to in support; when it does not, it is 
disregarded or accorded little weight. By way of example only, from an 
English case: 94 
                                                                       
93 Rothstein J continued in the following paragraph: 
If a trial judge concludes that proposed expert evidence is unnecessary or 
irrelevant or will distract from the issues to be decided, he or she should 
disallow such evidence from being introduced. I will also suggest that 
proposed expert and survey evidence be a matter for consideration at the case 
management stage of proceedings so that if such evidence would not be 
admissible at trial, much of the cost of engaging experts and conducting 
surveys may be avoided. 
94 Associated Newspapers Ltd v Express Newspapers [2003] FSR 51 at [43], per Laddie J. 
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Notwithstanding the defendant’s criticisms, the [plaintiff ’s] survey 
does give a feel for the reaction of members of the public to the 
defendant’s proposed newspaper … The outcome of the survey 
accords with one’s expectations. 
49 And a Singapore case: 
[in the High Court] The survey by Sinclair merely confirms what the 
witnesses before me are all saying, that ‘Millenia’ and ‘Millennium’ are 
visually and phonetically similar and that the public might think that 
there is a relationship or connection between RCMS and say 
Millennium Orchard.95 
[in the Court of Appeal] This evidence merely corroborates the 
learned judge’s finding that there was confusion.96 
50 In England, the leading practitioners’ text, Kerly’s Law of Trade 
Marks and Trade Names,97 summarises the net effect of the rules for the 
admission of survey evidence:98 
[I]t is very difficult to design a survey which will pass muster in court, 
and their design has become a very specialised art. One technique 
which improves the chances of useful evidence being obtained is to 
begin with a very open question, such as ‘what can you tell me about 
this product?’ and to move on to ones which are gradually more 
specific, such as ‘can you tell me who makes this product?’ The 
evidence of respondents who give useful answers to the very broad 
question is then untainted, while leaving an opportunity still to get 
evidence from persons who misunderstand what the interest of the 
interviewer is. 
51 Even this cautious view of surveys is now outmoded after the 
judgment of Lewison LJ in Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc,99 which 
would permit only “a statistically reliable and well conducted poll”.100 
52 On the other hand, the Singapore courts have adopted a robust 
attitude to objections to the admissibility of survey evidence in trade 
mark infringement and passing off cases. In CDL Hotels International 
Ltd v Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd, L P Thean JA said of the survey evidence 
                                                                       
95 Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd v CDL Hotels International Ltd [1997] 1 SLR(R) 422  
at [104], per Chao Hick Tin J; affirmed by the Court of Appeal in CDL Hotels 
International Ltd v Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 975 at [76]. 
96 CDL Hotels International Ltd v Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 975 at [79], 
per L P Thean JA. 
97 Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011. 
98 Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2011)  
at para 21-026. 
99 [2013] ETMR 11 at [62]. 
100 Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] FSR 21 at [54]; in the following 
paragraph, he emphasised that the surveys be “statistically significant”, which in 
turn will increase the cost. 
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adduced by the plaintiffs to show the opinion of the members of the 
public surveyed that the two words, “Millenia” and “Millennium”, were 
similar visually and phonetically:101 
It was to show that such belief or opinion exists among a certain 
number of people; it was not admitted to prove the truth or merits of 
such belief or opinion so held. In Saga Foodstuffs Manufacturing (Pte) 
Ltd v Best Food Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 1013, one of the issues raised 
was whether the survey report tendered by the plaintiffs was 
admissible, and Warren L H Khoo J held as follows at [11]: 
I should therefore start by saying a word about the rule of 
hearsay and in what circumstances it may be said to be 
offended. It is simply this. When evidence is sought to be 
given of what someone said to the testifying witness, whether 
such evidence offends the rule against hearsay depends on 
the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be tendered. 
If it is sought to be tendered for the purpose of establishing 
the truth of what was said to the testifying witness, its 
introduction will offend the rule. On the other hand, if the 
purpose of tendering the evidence is merely to show that 
such a statement was made, and not that the statement is 
true, then the rule is not offended. 
The learned judge then turned to certain authorities and came to the 
following conclusion at [16]: 
It seems to me that evidence of the results of a market survey 
research of the kind in question in this suit is evidence of the 
existence of the belief or opinion held by the respondents to 
the survey. The purpose of tendering such evidence is to 
show that such belief or opinion exists; there is no question 
of tendering it for the purpose of proving the truth or merits 
of the belief or opinion so held. In my view, evidence as to 
whether and the extent to which a certain belief or opinion is 
held by a person or a group of persons, when that is in issue, 
is evidence of a fact in issue, and its admission falls within the 
general provision of s 5 of the Evidence Act for the reception 
of evidence of the existence or non-existence of every fact  
in issue.[102] 
53 Obviously, one of the merits of a survey is to avoid having to 
take direct evidence from a large number of witnesses, many of them 
                                                                       
101 CDL Hotels International Ltd v Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 975 at [76], 
per L P Thean JA. 
102 Cf Doctor’s Associates Inc v Lim Eng Wah [2012] 3 SLR 193 at [48], in which Judith 
Prakash J adopted the more conventional view when she characterised surveys as 
expert evidence, which presumably therefore falls within s 47 rather than s 5 of the 
Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). 
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saying the same thing, and L P Thean JA proceeded103 to refer with 
approval to a New Zealand judgment, Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse 
Bros Ltd,104 on the practical advantages of allowing such evidence. In that 
case, Mahon J said:105 
A properly drawn market research questionnaire, carefully framed so 
as to elicit opinions or beliefs held by persons adequately informed, 
can only reveal in my opinion the existence or otherwise in a defined 
proportion of the persons interviewed, of the relevant opinion or 
belief, and I do not think it can be right in cases involving trade mark 
infringement or passing off where evidence of reputation is relevant, 
and especially in a passing off action where affidavit evidence is not 
receivable, to compel a party to produce in the courtroom an 
interminable parade of witnesses to depose individually as to their 
knowledge and understanding of the trade association involved in a 
particular trade mark or design, so long as there are followed the 
cautionary procedures recommended in the article in the New York 
University Law Review above cited [RC Sorensen & TC Sorensen, The 
Admissibility and Use of Opinion Evidence Research (1953) NYULR 1213]. 
The evidence obtained by research survey is in my view legitimate 
proof of the fact the opinions obtained had in fact existed, whether 
rightly held or not, and on that view of the matter it is my opinion 
that such evidence is not hearsay at all and that, even if it did fall 
within the technical concept of hearsay or representing a collation of 
individual statements made out of court, then the evidence would still 
be admissible by way of exception to the hearsay rule because it 
exhibits the existence of a state of mind shared in common by a 
designated class of persons. 
54 Where it is intended to carry out a survey, it is advisable to have 
it done by an independent organisation experienced in devising and 
carrying out surveys.106 The lead person from that organisation should 
present the survey results in an expert report, which should also contain 
full details of the instructions given to the individual interviewers. It is 
important to emphasise to the surveying team the need to record 
everything that is said, and even not said, by both the interviewers and 
interviewees involved, including prompting remarks that may indicate a 
less certain response than may be recorded. Leaving aside the common 
problem of surveys that contain leading questions,107 a failure to record 
                                                                       
103 CDL Hotels International Ltd v Pontiac Marina Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 975 at [77], 
per L P Thean JA. 
104 [1976] RPC 589. 
105 Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] RPC 589 at 595–596, per Mahon J. 
106 In Novelty Pte Ltd v Amanresorts Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 216 at [58], V K Rajah JA 
noted that a survey of visitors to the defendant’s show flat was “rather unscientific 
and [we] do not attach much weight on the results obtained”, emphasising that “if 
evidence based on surveys is to be relied on, it should be adduced in the form of 
expert evidence”. 
107 For a recent example of a survey that fell into this category, see Ferrero SPA v Sarika 
Connoisseur Café Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 176 at [109]. 
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responses and other reactions in full will often provide opposing 
counsel fertile ground on which to build an attack on the weight and 
credence to be given to the survey evidence. Thus, this type of expert 
evidence differs from that adduced otherwise in IP cases in that it is not 
opinion evidence as such that is given by the expert but rather the 
results of an independent survey, on the methodology and conduct of 
which he or she may be cross-examined. 
55 So prevalent have surveys become in trade mark infringement 
and passing off cases in Singapore that Judith Prakash J expressed some 
surprise in Doctor’s Associates Inc v Lim Eng Wah108 that survey evidence 
had not been adduced,109 but emphasised:110 
The issue of likelihood of confusion may be determined without the 
assistance of direct survey evidence (as was the case in City Chain  
at [57]). In fact, surveys come with their own problems: most recently, 
Chan Seng Onn J in Ferrero expressed doubt as to the ‘probative value’ 
of market surveys and implied that the accuracy of the surveys  
viz evidence of confusion would depend on the design (sample size, 
phrasing) of said surveys. In any case, neither survey evidence nor 
affidavit evidence is conclusive on its own. 
56 On similar lines, the English Court of Appeal in esure Insurance 
Ltd v Direct Line Insurance plc111 noted:112 
There is much to be said for the practice initiated by the late Pumfrey J 
(as he then was) in O2 Ltd v Hutchison 3G Ltd [2005] ETMR 61, and 
subsequently followed by Rimer J in U K Channel Management Ltd v 
E! Entertainment Television Inc [2008] FSR 5. Under this practice, case 
management directions are given at an interim stage requiring the 
parties to seek the directions of the court as to the scope or 
methodology of any proposed consumer survey that the parties may 
desire to put in evidence at trial. Those directions can then be given in 
advance of the trial. 
                                                                       
108 [2012] 3 SLR 193. 
109 Doctor’s Associates Inc v Lim Eng Wah [2012] 3 SLR 193 at [48]. 
110 Doctor’s Associates Inc v Lim Eng Wah [2012] 3 SLR 193 at [50]. 
111 [2008] EWCA Civ 842. 
112 esure Insurance Ltd v Direct Line Insurance plc [2008] ETMR 77 at [62]–[63],  
per Arden LJ. In Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] ETMR 11 at [149], 
Lewison LJ held that the standard form of order for case management should now 
make it clear that (a) a party could conduct a pilot survey without prior permission 
but at its own risk as to costs, (b) no further survey could be conducted without 
court permission, and (c) no evidence can be adduced from respondents to a 
survey without permission. 
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B. Other witness evidence 
57 Whilst it can be seen clearly from the recent Marks & Spencer  
plc v Interflora Inc113 judgment of the English Court of Appeal that the 
attitude to survey evidence in England is one of cautious acceptance 
(as long as it is statistically significant), the same case also considered 
the admissibility of evidence from witnesses identified by means of a 
“witness gathering exercise” carried out by a market research firm, 
sometimes called a “pilot survey”, although Lewison LJ noted that that 
term “is apt to cause confusion”.114 The court held that evidence from 
those witnesses could not be adduced as “they will have been led 
towards a particular mindset which no longer represents the 
unstimulated evidence of people in the real world”.115 Importantly, the 
court also raised serious questions as to the value of much of the 
evidence usually adduced in trade mark infringement cases, as it rarely 
assists the judge in deciding the legal question whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the average consumer. Lewison LJ 
concluded:116 
That is not to say there can never be evidence called in a case of trade 
mark infringement. The court may need to be informed of shopping 
habits; of the market in which certain goods or services are supplied; 
the means by which goods or services are marketed and so on. In 
addition I must make it clear … that different considerations may 
come into play where: 
(i) Evidence is called consisting of the spontaneous 
reactions of members of the relevant public to the allegedly 
infringing sign or advertisement; 
(ii) Evidence of consumers is called in order to amplify 
the results of a reliable survey; 
                                                                       
113 [2013] ETMR 11. 
114 Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] ETMR 11 at [19]. A “witness gathering 
exercise” or “pilot survey” is where a series of questions in relation to the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s products or marks is asked of a number of people, usually by a 
market research company, who have been pre-screened, again by questioning, in 
order to find the people who may become witnesses of confusion, although there is 
no intention to adduce the survey in evidence. 
115 Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] ETMR 11 at [136]. On conducting 
questionnaires in order to try and find witnesses who will give evidence of “real 
world confusion”, Lewison LJ stated firmly in a later visit of this case to the Court 
of Appeal on a different issue (Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc [2013] EWCA 
Civ 319 at [26]): “With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps I did not make my 
message clear enough in Interflora I. Let me say it again, but more loudly. A judge 
should not let in evidence of this kind unless the party seeking to call that evidence 
satisfies him (a) that it is likely to be of REAL value; and (b) that the likely value of 
the evidence justifies the cost” [emphasis in bold and capital letters as in original]. 
116 Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] ETMR 11 at [137], per Lewison LJ. 
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(iii) The goods or services in question are not goods or 
services supplied to ordinary consumers and are unlikely to 
be within the judge’s experience; 
(iv) The issue is whether a registered trade mark has 
acquired distinctiveness; or 
(v) Where the cause of action is passing off, which 
requires a different legal question to be answered. 
58 In relation to application hearings before the UK Trade Marks 
Registry (where an issue of, for example, “likelihood of confusion” 
under s 5(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 or “prior rights capable of 
being protected in a passing off action” under s 5(4) may arise), Kay LJ 
has commented:117 
Where litigation is commenced in the ordinary courts, the calling of 
expert evidence is now controlled by CPR 35.1. As I understand it, that 
does not apply to proceedings before a hearing officer in the Trade 
Marks Registry. Perhaps it should. However, even without its express 
application, it must be open to the Trade Marks Registry to control the 
nature and quality of evidence sought to be adduced before it as 
expert evidence. It should be encouraged to ensure that the sort of 
evidence that has attracted the disapproval of all three members of 
this court is excluded. In a case such as this, neither a hearing officer 
nor a judge in the Chancery Division requires the assistance of an 
‘expert’ when evaluating the likelihood of confusion from the 
standpoint of the average consumer. 
59 As a result of Kay LJ’s comments, the UK IP Office issued 
(Trade Marks) Tribunal Practice Note 2/2012, which came into effect on 
16 July 2012, and states: 
If a party wishes to adduce survey evidence it must seek the 
permission of the hearing officer. In seeking the permission of the 
hearing officer it must advise the hearing officer of all details of how it 
is intended for the survey to be conducted … 
The hearing officer will consider whether the proposed survey is likely 
to have any determinative effect upon the proceedings. 
If the hearing officer gives permission for survey evidence to be 
adduced, it will be necessary for it to conform to the criteria set out  
in the head note to Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984]  
RPC 293: 
If a survey is to have validity (a) the interviewees must be 
selected so as to represent a relevant cross-section of the 
public, (b) the size must be statistically significant, (c) it must 
be conducted fairly, (d) all the surveys carried out must be 
disclosed including the number carried out, how they were 
                                                                       
117 esure Insurance Ltd v Direct Line Insurance plc [2008] ETMR 77 at [82]. 
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conducted, and the totality of the persons involved, (e) the 
totality of the answers given must be disclosed and made 
available to the defendant, (f) the questions must not be 
leading nor should they lead the person answering into a 
field of speculation he would never have embarked upon had 
the question not been put, (g) the exact answers and not 
some abbreviated form must be recorded, (h) the instructions 
to the interviewers as to how to carry out the survey must be 
disclosed and (i) where the answers are coded for computer 
input, the coding instructions must be disclosed.[118] 
60 It is important also to bear in mind that the results of any 
witness-gathering exercise or survey, even one that does not produce the 
result wished by the party conducting or commissioning it, must be 
disclosed to the other side as part of the disclosure (discovery) process. 
61 In closing this section on trade mark infringement and passing 
off in England and Singapore, it is noteworthy that at the European 
level, the Court of Justice of the European Union held in Gut 
Springenheide GmbH v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt119 that both 
it and national courts will generally not require the assistance of surveys 
or other expert evidence to make decisions as to the state of mind of the 
“average consumer”, although surveys could be adduced in difficult 
cases. In the Community Trade Marks Office (or, to give it its correct 
name, the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market 
(“OHIM”)), it is recognised that surveys may be useful if they are 
“impeccably conducted”.120 
VII. Copyright cases 
62 The role of the expert in copyright infringement cases is not to 
provide an opinion either on whether there has been copying or copying 
of a substantial part of the plaintiff ’s work; obviously, those are 
decisions for the judge only. However:121 
[S]ometimes the court will benefit from tutoring from experts to 
appreciate the similarities and differences between the claimant’s and 
defendant’s work and to appreciate better how those in the art design 
                                                                       
118 In Marks & Spencer plc v Interflora Inc [2013] ETMR 11, before a thorough review 
of the authorities, Lewison LJ characterises Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd 
[1984] RPC 293 as the “watershed case on the admission of survey evidence” 
(at [77]), and one which “dealt a body blow to the reception of survey evidence” 
(at [61]). 
119 [1998] ECR I-04657 at [30]–[32]. 
120 See Anne Niedermann, Surveys as Evidence in Proceedings Before OHIM (2006)  
37 IIC 260. 
121 IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd [2005] FSR 434 (HC) at [40], 
per Laddie J. 
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the type of works with which the action is concerned. They can also 
provide valuable evidence of what are common design techniques in 
the trade. The latter, in particular, may help the court to decide for 
itself whether the alleged similarities are likely to have been arrived at 
independently. 
63 In the same case, which involved allegations of copyright 
infringement by a competing magazine, Laddie J commented of the 
defendant’s expert witness:122 “it appears to me that he started his 
examination of the complaints in this action with the firm view that no 
one in this trade, save for malicious big companies, ever copies”. 
64 On the other hand, the judge considered the plaintiff ’s expert 
evidence “even worse” and “[i]t appears that he thought part of his 
remit to consider whether copying had taken place”.123 However, 
notwithstanding these criticisms, the judge emphasised that the experts’ 
reports were not “of no value. Both gave evidence as to what were 
common design techniques and ideas in this field.” 
65 This case illustrates well the importance of the expert being able 
to justify his opinions, rather than display preconceived notions and 
prejudices. 
66 In relation to copyright cases involving software, George Wei 
(now a Judicial Commissioner) notes that “expert testimony on the 
similarities and differences may be crucial in establishing objective 
similarity between the defendant’s work and a substantial part of the 
plaintiff ’s work.”124 
67 However, it is not permissible to adduce expert evidence on 
whether the defendant’s work is a copy of a substantial part of the 
plaintiff ’s: that is a question for the court.125 
                                                                       
122 IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd [2005] FSR 434 at [41]. 
123 IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd [2005] FSR 434 at [42]. 
124 George Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore (SNP Editions, 2nd Ed, 2000)  
at para 8.14, referring to Aztech Systems Pte Ltd v Creative Technology Ltd [1995]  
3 SLR(R) 568 (HC) and Creative Technology Ltd v Aztech Systems Pte Ltd [1996]  
3 SLR(R) 673 (CA), by way of example. 
125 George Wei refers to the first instance judgment of Lawrence Collins QC in 
Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [1998] FSR 803 at 811, in 
which it was noted that the traditional view that expert evidence is not admissible 
on the “ultimate or real issue” was altered in England by s 3(1) of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1972 (c 30), that allows expert evidence on any relevant matter. 
However, notwithstanding s 3(1), the Court of Appeal, [2000] FSR 121 at [24], 
made it quite clear that although all “material and helpful” evidence would be 
admitted, it was “not the function of the expert to decide the question of 
substantiality” (at [22], per Morritt LJ) (the House of Lords made no comment on 
this issue when overruling the Court of Appeal and restoring the decision of the 
trial judge.) What Lawrence Collins QC described as “the traditional view” must 
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VIII. Breach of confidence cases 
68 In an English breach of confidence case in which there were 
competing expert reports, the judge warned against merely submitting 
conflicting expert witness reports and leaving it to the judge to come to 
his own view:126 
A judge is very rarely helped by competing expert reports, which 
express opinions, which are not tested or not maintainable by 
reference to supporting material. It is not useful to leave the judge to 
find his own analysis of the reports of experts without the experts 
being put to the test by cross examination. 
69 As a general matter, the patent cases referred to above are of 
direct relevance to issues that may arise from the use of expert witnesses 
in cases of alleged breach of confidence. 
IX. Conclusion 
70 As can be seen from this review of only a few of the many IP 
cases decided in recent years both in Singapore and England, the use of 
expert evidence is commonplace. Weaknesses in expert evidence are 
commonplace too; sometimes the weaknesses are such that the evidence 
should be excluded, on other occasions they render the evidence of little 
value, but in all cases, the reliance on expert evidence and particularly 
on survey evidence will have increased the cost of the litigation for both 
sides (and rarely does the costs award make that increase good for the 
successful party).127 Aside from the more general policy concerns 
regarding expert evidence, this is an important reason why the courts 
must always be vigilant in ensuring in IP cases that expert evidence is 
allowed only when it is clearly of assistance to them in their role as the 
ultimate arbiter on questions of law. 
 
                                                                                                                               
remain the position in Singapore in view of the exclusionary basis of the Evidence 
Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) explained above, see nn 6–7 and 17 above. 
126 EPI Environmental Technologies Inc v Symphony Plastic Technologies plc [2005]  
FSR 22 (HC) at [76], per Peter Smith J. 
127 See, however, Jeffrey Pinsler, “Proportionality in Costs” (2011) 23 SAcLJ 125, on 
the changes made by the Rules of Court (Amendment No 3) Rules 2010 
(S 504/2010), which concludes at para 32 with the wish that “through the proper 
application of the proportionality principle, costs will become a vital consideration 
in the series of processes which constitute civil litigation”. 
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